In this paper we demonstrate a methodology aimed at coping with resource allocation under Knightian (non-probabilistic) uncertainty by focusing on the example of competing security measures. The results of this application to security resource allocation also allow us to postulate a possible positivist explanation for the way governments are allocating these expenditures today. We explore the determination of the level and nature of government expenditures that affect security in different ways, and demonstrate that it is better to robustsatisfice the citizen's expected utility rather than to attempt to maximize it. Moreover, our analysis highlights one rationale for heightened spending on one set of defense measures, when there is less reliable information about threats to national security and their consequences. 
Introduction
When allocating resources, policy makers, like households, face trade-offs. Many of the trade-offs households encounter can reasonably be modeled in a deterministic setting-their incomes may be uncertain, but when deciding between a new refrigerator or a new television set, we generally assume that members of a household know the marginal utility they will derive from each. By contrast, policy makers nearly always confront decisions in which the connection between allocations and the desirability of outcomes are highly uncertain. No one can predict precisely by how much a dollar transferred between different components of the public health budget will affect an individual citizen's longevity. Nonetheless, policy makers know a great deal about the prevalence of infectious diseases, heart problems, and cancer in the population as a whole, and the efficacy of different treatments for large samples of patients. By combining the two, decision makers can derive fairly reliable probabilistic models that link different allocations of funding with the moments of a distribution of outcomes.
Unlike public health decisions, allocating resources for national security involves decisions where experiments are not possible (or at least unwise) and previous experience provides little or no useful data. Policy makers never know the exact probability distribution of possible damages to their citizens associated with alternative allocations of resources to government agencies. For instance, resources allocated to law enforcement agencies and department of defense may change the distribution of damages to an 'average' citizen from, say, criminal activities or traffic accidents on one hand, and those associated with an attack by terrorists or a belligerent neighbor on the other hand. Furthermore, terror attacks, or invasions by belligerent neighbors, are discrete, unique and relatively infrequent events that involve a small number of actors. When allocating resources to enhance the security of their citizens, policy makers have to decide on such appropriations without knowing the effects of their decisions on the ensuing distribution of possible damages, or at best have only some qualitative knowledge about these relationships. Experience simply does not supply enough information to derive the actual probability distribution of disutility from these different kinds of risks. Nor does it deliver a clear picture of the relationships between different levels and types of security expenditures to enhancing personal safety and protecting the nation from wars or terrorism, and the loss of human life and economic disruption such dangers entail. In this paper we demonstrate a methodology aimed at coping with resource allocation under Knightian (non-probabilistic) uncertainty by focusing on the example of competing security measures. The results of this application to security resource allocation also allow us to postulate a possible positivist explanation for the way governments are allocating these expenditures today. We explore the determination of the level and nature of government expenditures that affect security in different ways, and demonstrate that it is better to robustsatisfice the citizen's expected utility rather than to attempt to maximize it. Moreover, our analysis highlights one rationale for heightened spending on one set of measures, (defense), when there is much less information about its consequences or likelihood, when compared to those associated with crime and law-enforcement.
While our formulation in section 2 is generic, we illustrate it in section 3 with two examples. First, in the case of a terrorist threat, the trade-off is between non-security related expenditure, expenditure on counterterrorist operations abroad, and domestic security expenditures. In the case of a conventional threat, the security expenditures must be divided between intelligence gathering and war-fighting capabilities. Threats to national security of either type and their relationships to both defense and law-enforcement expenditures are particularly pertinent to the analysis of a highly uncertain world.
Formulation
Consider a country facing various threats to its national security. These threats may emanate from various sources including the threat of an invasion by an aggressive neighbor or a terrorist attack. We describe the threats to security from all sources as a bivariate distribution that includes both the event of being attacked, and the damage that the country will sustain, conditional on the attack taking place, recognizing and dealing with the fact that this distribution is highly uncertain. Policy makers must decide what portion of the economy's resources they will devote to countering these risks, as well as how to allocate this expenditure between different defense measures when each measure affects both the risk and the potential damage from an attack in a different way. This defense resource allocation dilemma is embedded within a standard economic framework in which the representative individual in this country derives utility u(c) only from consumption, c, and that the threats we enumerated above are all expressed in terms of a drop in the value of this variable.
Normalizing the economy's resources to 1, the policy maker must choose the fraction of all resources it will devote to each of a number of different risk-mitigating expenditures χ = (χ 1 , . . . , χ N ). Without government debt, we require The probability density function (pdf) of realized threats, conditioned on risk mitigating expenditures, is p(ψ|χ)-a probability distribution unknown to policy makers. The best available estimate of p(ψ|χ) is denoted p(ψ|χ) but it is incontrovertible that p(ψ|χ) is highly unreliable.
We assume that the probability that a representative agent will suffer a loss in his welfare from an attack is P w . The value of P w is highly uncertain and its best estimate, P w , depends on both the level and distribution of defense expenditures.
Let R(χ|p, P w ) be the expected utility resulting from defense expenditure χ, when the probability of the threat being realized is P w , and the pdf of the damage ψ is p(ψ|χ):
Higher expected utility is preferable over lower expected utility, but R c is the lowest acceptable level of expected utility. It is a reward aspiration or a 'reservation reward'.
The info-gap model is a family of nested sets of probability models p(ψ|χ) and P w (χ), indexed by α, which represents the degree of uncertainty in the policy maker's best estimate of the chances of any damage occurring and the conditional distribution of its level. We denote this info-gap model by F [α, p(ψ|χ) , P w (χ)], where α ≥ 0.
Info-gap models obey two axioms:
(i ) Nesting asserts that the range of possible pdfs increases as α increases:
(ii ) Contraction asserts that, when α = 0, the estimated models are the only possibilities:
These two axioms endow α with its meaning of a horizon of uncertainty.
Let µ(χ, α) be the lowest expected reward given defense expenditures χ over an info-gap model α around p and P w . That is:
The value α(χ, R c ) is the robustness of expenditures χ with reward-aspiration R c . It is the greatest range of Knightian uncertainty, α, up to which all probability models in F result in reward no less than R c :
α(χ, R c ) is the robustness (to uncertainty in p and P w ) of security expenditures χ which satisfice the expected utility at the level R c .
The robustness function displays a fundamental trade-off between reward and robustness to uncertainty: robustness decreases as the aspired reward increases (Ben-Haim, 2006) :
Furthermore, if the aspiration is for the greatest reward expected with the estimated distribution, then the robustness is zero (Ben-Haim, 2005) :
This means that if the estimated models p(ψ|χ) and P w are used to choose an expectedutility-maximizing allocation χ * , then this aspiration has zero robustness to uncertainty in these models.
Since more robustness is preferable to less robustness, at the same level of satisficed utility, the decision maker may wish to choose χ to satisfice the utility and to maximize the robustness. This is an info-gap robust-satisficing decision approach, which is formally defined:
In this paper we adopt a variation of the classical info-gap approach in which the policy maker chooses the value of χ that maximizes the lowest possible value of expected utility over a set of probabilities and distribution functions indexed by α around the best estimates.
For any desired level of robustness α, the decision maker will choose χ to maximize µ(α, χ)
as defined in eq. 4. Note that for any aspiration level
An Illustration with Two Types of Security Expenditure
In this section we illustrate, hypothetically, how policy makers use fragmentary and highly uncertain evidence to allocate resources between two different types of expenditures devoted to security.
Background
How do we quantify security threats, and what are the different possible security expenditures that are meant to counter them? Consider first a threat from a conventional adversary. and aggregate all the different costs of war. These included both the direct costs in military expenditure and physical destruction, and the indirect costs associated with the capitalized values of losses in life and lost production.
According to Broadberry and Howlett (1998) by Goldin and Lewis (1975) to study the Civil War. According to his estimates the total present value of foregone consumption that can be attributed to both direct and indirect losses generated by the war equals 2.27 years of consumption in 1941.
As most of its effects are indirect, the impact of terror is not as well understood. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) estimate that terrorism in the Basque country of Northern Spain has reduced GDP by ten percent. Similarly, recent estimates of the loss in GDP that can be attributed to the impact terrorism after three years of recurring terrorism against Israel is also around ten percent (Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) and Persitz (2005) (Harrison (1985) ).
Basic Structure
Consider an economy in which resources are allocated between civilian consumption, and two different types of security-related public expenditure. We divide security related public expenditures into two broad categories denoted χ 1 and χ 2 . Both χ 1 and χ 2 are measured as shares of GDP, and we ignore the possibility of international borrowing. The allocation of resources influences in different ways the pdf p(ψ|χ) of potential harm to a representative member of society. The first effect on p(ψ|χ) is that of the overall amount spent on security, χ 1 + χ 2 . The second influence on p(ψ|χ) comes from the composition of the security expenditures, (χ 1 , χ 2 ). These two effects jointly determine the pdf of damage, ψ, given total security expenditures, χ, as explained below.
In order to illustrate our approach we focus on two alternative types of military expendi- Given the high degree of uncertainty in planning for conflict, we will make the reasonable assumption that policy makers do not know the true damage probability density function (pdf). Risks are characterized by a pdf over a range of possible damage, up to a maximum potential level which we denote by z. Given the long planning horizon necessary to prepare for armed conflict, we assume that for policymakers the relevant unit of time is a decade.
Their best (but highly uncertain) estimate of the damage pdf conditional on being attacked and the chosen allocation of defense expenditure χ 1 and χ 2 is:
where the Γ function is given by Γ(x) = ∞ 0
is the indicator function and:
The mean of this pdf is:
This functional form for the best estimate of the damage density function reflects all available knowledge about possible damages from threats to national security, and how these risks are affected by both types of security expenditures. In particular, this functional form embeds the following underlying assumptions:
1. Mean damage generally declines as total security expenditure increases. That is, we expect behavior along the lines of:
2. Mean damage and extreme damage respond in opposite directions to increases in RMAtype expenditure, holding total security expenditure fixed. That is, we expect to generally observe: In this example we set θ = 3. In Figure 1 we present the density function p(ψ|χ) where the maximum damage z = 1/2, holding total defense expenditure constant at ten percent of GDP, and varying the value of the traditional military expenditure χ 1 .
The probability of suffering an attack over the course of a decade is also subject to uncertainty, and is also a function of the overall size as well as distribution of defense expenditure.
We denote the probability of attack by P w and the best (but highly uncertain) estimate of this function is given by:
where
b−1 dt and a(χ) and b(χ) are defined in eq. 10 and 11.
The term χ 1 + χ 2 is the total military expenditure, and reflects its deterrent value.
The term [β 1/2 (a, b)Γ(a + b)]/[Γ(a)Γ(b)]
is the probability of an enemy attack successfully inflicting at most half of the maximal potential damage. The higher this number is, the lower the likelihood that an adversary will be tempted to launch an attack. The salient feature that we illustrate in Figure 2 is that P w (χ) is a decreasing function of both types of expenditure.
Info-Gap Model of Uncertainty
The density function p(ψ|χ) in eq. (9) is the best estimate of the pdf of damage of an attack given security allocations χ. However, this estimate is based on fragmentary and controversial evidence and generally contains serious but unidentifiable errors. The same is to be said for the estimated probability of attack, P w (χ). The true values deviate from these estimates by unknown amounts.
We will use a fractional error info-gap model to represent the info-gaps in both the pdf of the damage and the probability of attack (Ben-Haim, 2006) . Let P denote the set of all pdfs on [0, 1]. Our info-gap model is the following unbounded family of sets of pdfs p(ψ) and probabilities P w :
F(α, p, P w ) includes every pdf p(ψ) that deviates proportionally from the estimated density p(ψ|χ), at any level of damage ψ, by no more than α. Similarly, F(α, p, P w ) contains all attack-probabilities P w which differ proportionally from the estimated value P w (χ) by no more than α. The value of the fractional error, α, is unknown. Hence the info-gap model is not a single set, but rather an unbounded family of nested sets of possible pdfs and probabilities. Since α is unbounded there is no worst case.
Robustness Function
The expected utility if an attack occurs, based on the estimated pdf of damage, is:
Recall that the utility if an attack does not occur is u c , equal to u(χ c ). We assume that this is greater than the estimated expected utility in the case of attack:
The total estimated expected utility, based on the estimated pdf of damage p(ψ|χ) and the estimated probability of attack P w (χ), is:
The expected utility for arbitrary p(ψ|χ) and P w is specified in eq. (1) (18), is derived in the appendix, section 5. Suppressing the notational dependence on χ, the result is:
where:
and ψ m is the median of p(ψ|χ). Because we assume positive marginal utility we see that r 1 > r 2 . Hence δ r > 0. This, together with eq. (18), implies that r − u c − δ r < 0.
Numerical Results
We adopt the constant-risk-aversion utility function u(c) = c 1−γ /(1 − γ), where γ > 0. The nominal pdf of damage is defined in eqs. (9)- (11), and the probability of attack is defined in (15). The value of R in (19) is expressed in terms of utility. In our economy the representative individual has a maximum of a single unit of consumption, from which defense expenditure and damage are deducted. Therefore in our simulations we convert the values of R in (19) which are in units of utility into their consumption equivalents. and 300% error in the probability models. For the frame with robustness α = n, each contour is indexed by an R c value and consists of all defense expenditures (χ 1 , χ 2 ) at which
Consider the four panels on the right-hand side of Figure 3 that correspond to maximum possible damage of 100%, z = 1. Recall from eq. 7 that a policy maker who wishes to maximize the expected utility must accept zero robustness to uncertainty. This is the case where an attack has the potential to drive consumption all the way to zero. Looking at the upper right-hand panel of Figure 3 , we find that if policy makers maximize expected utility under p(ψ|χ) and P w (χ), the greatest level at which the expected utility can be satisficed is obtained if they choose to allocate 7.4% of GDP to defense and set χ 1 = .027 and χ 2 = .047. Table 2 , under expected utility maximization the policymakers are willing to tolerate a high probability of being attacked ( P w (χ)=.517), a relatively high level of expected Table 2 : Values of χ 1 , χ 2 ,P W , E(ψ | χ), Pr{ψ ≥ .4z} and c E at the highest levels at which expected utility can be satisficed with robustness equal to 0, 1, 2 and 3, and z=1/2 and 1.
As illustrated in
attacked, of expected damage and the probability of suffering losses above 40% of GDP drop at these higher levels of expenditure.
Comparing the two different levels of defense expenditures and their allocations, we find that by demanding robustness against the unreliability of the probabilistic estimates of both damage and attack, a policymaker will substantially raise the amount of resources devoted to security. Furthermore rather than increasing the allocations to each by either the same amount or increasing them by the same proportions, we find that the allocation is now skewed in favor of the more traditional type of expenditures, χ 1 . This property is even more emphasized when the required robustness increases to 200%, where the total amount of defense expenditure is 40.8% and χ 1 = .287 and χ 2 = .121, or 300% where the total amount of defense expenditure is 48.1% and χ 1 = .349 and χ 2 = .132.
This example implies that to achieve even 100% robustness requires devoting a large fraction of the economy's resources to defense. However this example was calculated with the maximum damage set to z = 1-so the threat involves some positive probability of complete annihilation.
When the maximum threat is set to z = 1/2 expected utility is maximized with a meager When policymakers demand robustness at a level of 100%, the allocation between traditional and RMA-type expenditures is 4.7% and 5.1% respectively. If they require a robustness level of 200%, the total expenditure rises to 18.6% and traditional expenditures, χ 1 , more than double to 12.5%. At 300% robustness, total expenditure is 26.3% more than two-thirds of which (χ 1 = 0.188) is devoted to the traditional military.
In the last column in Table 2 , we present the values of c E , which reflect different levels of welfare associated with each combination of required robustness α and the defense allocation χ 1 and χ 2 . First, we define R E (n) as the greatest value at which the expected utility can be satisficed with robustness equal to n. That is:
The value of c E is the consumption-equivalent to R E (n), defined through the utility func- Table 2 .
The values of c E in Table 2 demonstrate that achieving robustness comes with a cost. For example, consider the case where the maximum level of damage equals 1/2 and α = 0. That is, the policy maker is willing put his complete trust in the estimated damage probability distribution and the probability of war, and how these depend on the level and allocation of defense expenditures. In this case as mentioned above, the policy maker chooses to devote only 1.5% of GDP to defense, all of which allocated to RMA-type expenditures.
This generates a value of c E =.861-hence the combined loss in welfare associated with the defense expenditure, the random effects of these expenditures on the probability of war, and its accompanying damage is worth 14% of GDP. If on the other hand the policy maker has less faith in the probability distribution and chooses to insulate himself against deviations of up to 100% from both the estimated distributions the policy he will adopt will be to set defense expenditures at 9.8% of GDP nearly equally divided between traditional and RMAtype expenditures. Achieving this level of robustness lowers the value of c E to 0.67, and additional 19% of GDP, compared to the defense allocation associated with zero robustness.
Conclusion
The application of the information gap approach to the question of defense spending yields three main conclusions. First, the higher the robustness policy makers demand, the higher should be the overall level of defense expenditures. Second, the higher the robustness demanded, the more policy makers should favor those defense measures that are most likely to prevent extreme high levels of damage.
Beyond these normative conclusions the model also provides positive predictions. In a world with unreliable probabilistic information, we expect policy makers to favor higher expenditure on defense than would be appropriate if the only goal were expected utility maximization. Furthermore, it would seem that policy makers will favor expenditures on weapons systems and associated tactics and strategies that are both most effective in preventing worst case scenarios and also are better understood. These would suggest one possible rationale for military planners' tendency for conservatism.
Appendix: Derivation of the Robustness Function
In this appendix we derive the robustness function in eq. (20) based on assumption (18) and for values of the robustness not in excess of unity: α ≤ 1. We make no assumptions about the utility function u(c) other than that the marginal utility is positive:u(c) > 0.
The robustness is defined in eq.(5). The main task is to find the pdf of the damage, p(ψ|χ), which, at horizon of uncertainty α, minimizes the expected utility R(χ|p, P w ) defined in eq.(1).
Because the marginal utility is positive it is evident that R(χ|p, P w ) is minimized by that pdf in U(α, p, P w ) which puts as much weight as possible at large damage and as little weight as possible at low damage. For the fractional-error info-gap model in eq. (16) 
where ψ m is the median of the estimated pdf p(ψ|χ) and where α ≤ 1.
If α > 1 then min α R(χ|p, P w ) occurs with the following pdf:
where ψ s satisfies:
(1 + α)
In other words, ψ s is the 1 − 1/(1 + α) quantile of p(ψ|χ).
We will consider only the case α ≤ 1. The derivation of robustness in excess of unity is analogous.
The utility R(χ|pP w ) in eq. (1), evaluated with the pdf in eq. (25), is:
where r and δ r are defined in eqs. (17) and (23) and u c is the utility if an attack does not occur, u(χ c ). The term r − δ r α − u c is negative so the minimizing value of P w in U(α, p, P w )
is (1 + α) P w . Thus the minimum expected utility, up to horizon of uncertainty α, is: 
Denote this minimum µ(α), which decreases monotonically as α increases because δ r > 0.
The robustness is, according to the definition in eq.(5), the greatest value of α up to which µ(α) is no less than R c . That is, the robustness is the lowest non-negative solution for α of:
This is a quadratic equation in α whose least non-negative root is eq.(20).
The derivation of the robustness function in eq. (30) is obtained by equating eq. (28) to R c and solving for α, with P w (χ) instead of P w .
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